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Loyola Marymount University 
There is considerable structural symmetry between moral and intellectual character virtues. 
This is evident in the fact that many moral virtues have straightforward counterparts among the 
intellectual virtues. We speak, for instance, of moral but also of intellectual courage, honesty, 
integrity, fairness, autonomy, and humility. The same goes for moral and intellectual vices. A 
person can be a moral or intellectual coward, morally or intellectually dishonest, morally or 
intellectually unfair, and the like.1  
In light of this symmetry, it is surprising that what is perhaps the paradigm moral vice has 
no obvious intellectual counterpart. The moral vice in question is malevolence. While there may be 
such a thing as “intellectual” or “epistemic malevolence,” this is hardly a familiar notion: it does 
not appear on any standard lists of intellectual vices; nor does it occupy anything like the central 
role in our thinking about intellectual vice that malevolence proper or “moral malevolence” 
occupies in our thinking about moral vice. This, then, suggests a notable structural asymmetry 
between moral and intellectual vice. 
 The aim of this paper is to explore this asymmetry in some depth. The discussion will be 
guided by three main questions: (1) Is there a counterpart to malevolence proper or “moral 
malevolence” among the intellectual virtues? (2) If so, what does it amount to? (3) And why 
does it fail to occupy the central role in our thinking about intellectual vice that malevolence 
proper occupies in our thinking about moral vice? To begin to answer these questions, we first 
must attempt to get clear on the basic character of malevolence proper. This, it turns out, is no 
easy task. Accordingly, the first half of the paper is spent addressing a range of questions about 
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malevolence proper. I then go on, in light of this discussion, to identify and illustrate a 
conception of epistemic malevolence. In the final part of the paper, I address the forementioned 
question concerning comparative role of epistemic malevolence in standard ways of thinking 
about intellectual vice as a whole.2  
1. Malevolence Proper 
I begin by with a very concise and general account of malevolence proper or “moral 
malevolence.” As I am thinking of it, malevolence is essentially or paradigmatically a matter of 
opposition to the good as such.3 Its spirit is captured in the infamous manifesto of Milton’s 
Satan: “Evil be thou my good,” which, to better fit the definition just noted, may be recast as: 
Good be thou my enemy. While an acceptable first approximation, this conception bears 
considerable scrutiny and elaboration.  
1.1 Opposition to the good 
First, what kind of opposition is essential to malevolence? Very briefly, malevolence 
involves “opposition to the good” that is robustly volitional, active, and “personally deep.” To 
say that this opposition is “robustly volitional” is to say that it centrally and fundamentally 
involves the will. Malevolence it is not a mere conviction that the good should be opposed, nor a 
mere preference for such. Rather it involves a kind of hostility or contempt the good. To say that 
the opposition characteristic of malevolence is “active” is to say that it tends to issue in actual 
attempts to stop, diminish, undermine, destroy, speak out, or turn others against the good. It is 
not a passive orientation. Finally, the opposition in question is “personally deep” in the sense that 
it reflects the malevolent person’s fundamental cares and concerns. A malevolent person cannot 
simply or easily give up or repudiate her malevolence: her opposition to the good is not a 
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commitment or orientation that she can simply take or leave. Rather, it is central to her very 
identity or self-conception.  
1.2 Opposition to the good as such 
A second, trickier aspect of malevolence concerns the idea that it involves opposition to 
the good as such.4 What exactly is it to be against the good—or anything, for that matter—“as 
such”? 
 While I cannot fully defend the view here, I think this notion is plausibly understood in 
terms of making something or someone an enemy. Just as we can choose to make someone a 
friend—to befriend another person—so too we can choose to make or “take up” another person 
or thing as an enemy. To coin a phrase, we can enemize. My suggestion is that to be opposed to 
X “as such” is to take or regard X as an enemy; it is to enemize X. This fits well with the idea 
that the kind of opposition characteristic of malevolence is “personally deep,” since our friends 
and enemies are among the things most personal to us. It also fits the gloss of Satan’s manifesto 
noted above: namely, “Good be thou my enemy.” 
 In a recent discussion of the vice of malice, Robert Adams (2007) suggests an alternative 
conception of what it is to be opposed to something “as such.” He defines malice as “opposition 
to the good for its own sake” and maintains that a person is opposed to X “for its own sake” just 
in case she is opposed to X “non-instrumentally,” that is, just in case she is opposed to X not 
merely for the sake of achieving some other end or goal (42-43). I shall assume that Adams and I 
are concerned with essentially the same trait and that his “for its own sake” is interchangeable 
with my “as such.” 
 Noninstrumental opposition and “enmity” do typically go hand in hand. However, the 
latter arguably provides a better way of understanding the claim that malevolence is opposition 
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to the good “as such,” for malevolence would appear to be consistent with instrumental 
opposition to a good—a possibility ruled out by Adams’s account. Note, first, that in the same 
way that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” we can say that “the friend of my enemy is my 
enemy.” Accordingly, suppose Jones is my enemy and Smith is the good friend and close ally of 
Jones. Apart from his relation to Jones, I have nothing against Smith. Nevertheless, in an effort 
to harm or spite Jones, I might make or declare Smith my enemy.5 This in turn might bring about 
an opposition to Smith that is robustly volitional, active, and personally deep. I see no reason 
why this orientation might not also be malevolent, notwithstanding the fact my only reason for 
opposing Smith is to bring down Jones. Alternatively, imagine a soldier who, out of a love for 
his country, becomes deeply, actively, and personally opposed to his enemies in combat. These 
are people whom, if not for the war, the soldier would have nothing against. Here again it seems 
the soldier’s orientation toward his enemies might count as malevolent while nevertheless being 
instrumental in nature. Thus while malevolence may typically involve noninstrumental 
opposition, this would not appear to be a requirement. If so, it is a mistake to think of the 
relevant “as such” qualification in terms of such opposition. A better account of this qualification 
is one that appeals to the notion of making someone or something an enemy.  
1.3 Impersonal vs. personal malevolence 
 A third important point concerns the object of malevolence itself. If we take Milton’s 
Satan as a paradigm, it looks as though the immediate object of malevolence is rather abstract or 
impersonal, for Satan is apparently opposed to the good or to goodness itself. While I do think 
malevolence can take something like this form, surely this is not a requirement. A person can be 
malevolent simply on account of his orientation toward other persons, for example, by opposing 
another person’s well-being or share in the good. Such an orientation is independent of the 
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malevolent person’s orientation toward goodness in general. This, then, suggests a distinction 
between “impersonal” and “personal” malevolence. In the case of impersonal malevolence, the 
object is impersonal in the sense just noted; in the case of personal malevolence, the object is a 
person’s or a group of people’s well-being or share in the good.  
It might be thought, however, that the very notion of impersonal malevolence is 
problematic: that, for instance, there is something odd or implausible in the idea of opposition to 
something abstract or impersonal like goodness or the good in general. While I share this 
reservation to some extent, I think there remain good reasons to take seriously the idea of 
impersonal malevolence. First, we sometimes think or speak of, say, a person’s love of justice or 
of beauty. Here the object in question presumably is justice or beauty itself, not merely, say, the 
set or any subset of just states of affairs or beautiful objects. But if we can be for an impersonal 
end like justice or beauty, why doubt that we can be opposed to the good or to goodness in 
general? Second, the notion of impersonal malevolence does have at least some intuitive traction. 
Again, Milton’s Satan would not appear to be opposed merely or even primarily to the well-
being of any one person or group of people. Nor does it seem quite right to think that he is 
opposed, say, to the well-being of every person besides himself. Instead, his wickedness seems to 
run deeper and to be more formal in character. He is, it seems, opposed to goodness itself or to 
the good in general.  
Moreover, we need not limit our attention in this context to the Judeo-Christian character 
of Satan. Super-villains like the Joker, for instance, while no doubt opposed to the well-being of 
many individuals, also seems fundamentally opposed to goodness itself or to some such general 
or abstract end.6 The latter, rather than the well-being of any individual or group of individuals, 
is an intuitively more plausible characterization of the object of the Joker’s malevolence. Indeed, 
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this would appear to be what makes him, and his diabolical counterpart, so frightening and 
wicked.  
Note, finally, that the notion of impersonal malevolence is consistent with the possibility 
that the object of such malevolence is a kind of abstraction or idealization. It may be, for 
instance, that Milton’s Satan shifts from being against, say, the well-being of God or of God and 
God’s followers, to being against the good or goodness in general, where the latter is, in Satan’s 
mind at least, an abstraction of the former. 7 It does not follow from this that Satan’s malevolence 
is “personal” in the relevant sense; nor that it is itself an abstraction or idealization. Thus while 
there may be something prima facie odd about impersonal malevolence, it is a coherent concept, 
and I shall continue to take it seriously.8 
1.4 The scope of malevolence 
 A fourth and related aspect of malevolence that merits attention is its scope. Particularly 
when thinking of malevolence on the impersonal model just identified, it is difficult to escape the 
impression that the scope of malevolence is maximally broad. However, there is something at 
least prima facie problematic about this suggestion. For instance, if I am really opposed to 
goodness itself, then it seems I shall be opposed to all that is good, and thus to anyone’s share in 
the good, including my own. But of course we do not tend to think of malevolent persons as 
opposed to their own well-being. Similarly, suppose that human well-being consists partly in an 
ability to freely choose what to be for and what to be against. If so, then a person opposed to the 
good as a whole or to goodness itself apparently must be opposed to her own opposition, since 
this opposition represents an exercise of the relevant, valuable ability. But again, this conflicts 
with our intuitive understanding of malevolence, for malevolent persons certainly need not—and 
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perhaps cannot—be against their own opposition to the good. This suggests that there is, after all, 
something problematic about the very idea of impersonal malevolence.  
 There are two problems with this objection. First, it is not difficult to imagine that 
someone like Satan or the Joker might be opposed to goodness in general in the sense that he 
takes goodness or the good in general to be something worth opposing, and even “enemizes” the 
good as he conceives of it, but nonetheless fails to appreciate or take seriously the fact this 
opposition “commits” him to being opposed even to his own well-being and opposition to the 
good. Impersonal malevolence might, in other words, be accompanied by a kind of logical 
inconsistency and self-deception. The malevolent person might be committed, in principle at 
least, to opposing his own good, but might fail, through intellectual carelessness or dishonesty, to 
see that this is so, and thus to actually or actively “follow through” with his commitment.9 Again, 
while this might involve ascribing to the person in question a certain kind or degree of 
irrationality, such irrationality seems entirely consistent with malevolence. 
 Second, the scope of impersonal malevolence need not be as broad as the discussion thus 
far has suggested. For an impersonally malevolent agent, instead of being opposed to the good as 
a whole, might be opposed to some limited part or dimension of the good. Such a person might, 
for instance, actively and vehemently oppose generosity or neighborliness; and she might oppose 
it universally—opposing even the show of generosity or neighborliness toward herself.  Here the 
object of malevolence is still abstract or impersonal in the relevant sense, and yet it is not so 
broad as to raise any of the self-referential worries just noted. For this reason as well, the notion 
of personal malevolence remains worth taking seriously.  
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1.5 The psychological coherence of malevolence 
 A fifth and closely related feature of malevolence also concerns an apparent tension 
within its psychology. We have said that to be malevolent is to be opposed to the good as such 
(or to some dimension of the good or to one or more person’s share in the good). It is plausible 
to think, however, that to be opposed to something—at least in any sense relevant to 
malevolence—is to regard it “under the aspect” of the bad or to regard it as bad. If so, it can look 
as if to be malevolent is to regard as bad that which one regards as good: that it is ascribe 
contrary qualities to the object of malevolence. We have already seen that it would be a mistake 
to think of malevolence as an especially rational state. I take it, however, that intuitively it is not 
this irrational or irrational in this way. The malevolent person is not confused or of two minds 
about that which she opposes. In the two sections that follow, I consider how we might think 
about the psychology of malevolence so as to accommodate these facts. Doing so will require 
addressing some even “deeper” and more complicated aspects of the psychology of malevolence 
than those considered thus far. The payoff, however, is that we shall finally be in a position to 
identify an epistemic counterpart of malevolence.  
1.5.1 Subjective vs. objective conceptions of the object of malevolence 
 We may begin by noting that the worry in question arises—or arises in full force, at any 
rate—only if malevolence is understood as opposition to that which one regards as good. If 
malevolence is better understood as, say, opposition to that which in fact is good, then the 
forementioned point entails merely that malevolence is a matter of regarding as bad that which 
in fact is good; and this, on the surface at least, is considerably less objectionable than the claim 
that malevolence is a matter of regarding as bad that which one regards as good. We would do 
well, then, to distinguish between what I shall call a “subjective conception” of the object of 
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malevolence and an “objective conception,” and to try to determine which of these conceptions 
is the more plausible. Again, according to the subjective conception, malevolence is a matter of 
being opposed to something that one regards as good; and according to the objective conception, 
it is a matter of opposition to something which in fact is good.10 
 Which of these provides a more plausible characterization of malevolence? There are, I 
think, good reasons for preferring the subjective conception. Specifically, X’s being objectively 
or in fact good would appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient for a person’s opposition to X 
to count as malevolent. That it is not sufficient is evident in connection with cases of what I shall 
call “benign opposition” to a genuine good. Suppose that a person S has grown up in a 
community the identity of which is rooted in its opposition to a genuine good G. S has long been 
taught of the problems, limits, even evils, associated with G. S even has good testimonial 
grounds for thinking that G is bad; and nothing about his own experience or knowledge relative 
to G threatens to defeat or undercut these grounds. As S matures, he develops a staunch personal 
opposition to G, one that manifests itself in S’s actively and vehemently opposing G. While S is 
opposed in the relevant sense to a genuine good, I take it that we would not regard S as 
malevolent. For again, S is opposing what he has good reason to think is a genuine evil (which, 
in general, is actually a good or appropriate stance to take). This suggests that X’s being 
objectively good is not sufficient for opposition to X’s being malevolent.  
 Neither is it necessary. For we can imagine cases in which someone is personally and 
actively opposed to what he has good reasons—reasons of the sort just noted, say—to think is a 
genuine good, but which in fact is not. Again, if the person is opposed in the relevant, robustly 
volitional and “personal” way to what he thinks or perceives—and thinks or perceives on 
reasonable grounds—is a genuine good, I take it that we would consider him malevolent, even if 
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the object of his opposition were in fact evil. If so, we may conclude that X’s being objectively 
good is neither necessary nor sufficient for opposition to X’s being malevolent, and thus that the 
subjective conception of the object of malevolence is preferable to the objective conception.11 
 The subjective conception also fits well with certain intuitive ways of thinking about 
malevolence. Malevolence is an especially pernicious or insidious vice; it is a form of 
wickedness. And part of what makes it wicked, it seems, is that it involves something like a 
“knowing” opposition to a “genuine” good. Intuitively, a malevolent person opposes something 
or someone which she is aware of as having a certain value or worth; this is part of what makes 
her opposition malevolent rather than, say, simply misguided or mistaken.12  
1.5.2 Resolving the tension 
We are now in a position to return to the challenge noted above concerning how to make 
coherent sense of the psychology of malevolence. Recall that if we accept a subjective account of 
the object of malevolence, together with the further claim that one’s “opposing” something in the 
relevant sense requires that one “regard” that thing as bad, it turns out that malevolence 
necessarily involves regarding as bad that which one also regards as good. But again, this can 
suggest that malevolence involves a kind of psychological duality or incoherence that we do not 
tend to ascribe to it. In what coherent and intuitively plausible sense, then, might malevolence 
involve the relevant contrasting attitudes? It is important to note that there need not be just a 
single right answer to this question. There may be multiple ways in which the psychological 
tension can be resolved: multiple ways, that is, in which malevolence can plausibly be thought of 
as involving both a positive and a negative assessment of its object. In what follows, I shall 
identify four such ways.   
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 First, in certain cases, there may exist a semantic gap between the relevant judgments, 
such that the malevolent person does not, strictly speaking, ascribe contrary qualities to the 
object of his malevolence, and thus may not exhibit an obviously problematic level or kind of 
irrationality. For instance, someone might acknowledge the object of his opposition as a “good,” 
on the one hand, but nevertheless regard it as “worthy of opposition” or as “meriting destruction 
or diminishment,” on the other. Such an orientation would not involve an acceptance of two 
explicitly contrary propositions. Would it be consistent with malevolence? It seems to me that 
indeed it might. That said, if the person were to regard the relevant object as “good” and as 
“worthy of opposition” at the same cognitive “level,” so to speak, and to do so while invoking a 
univocal standard of goodness or worth, then perhaps he might be of two minds or ambivalent in 
a way that malevolent persons intuitively are not. For this reason, while I think the present 
possibility goes some way toward resolving the tension in question, it is most plausible when 
combined with some of the other possibilities noted below.  
 A second way, just alluded to, in which a malevolent person might plausibly regard the 
object of her malevolence as both good and bad is if she employs alternate concepts of good and 
bad in her assessment this object. Someone might, for instance, oppose the well-being of a 
particular group of people, which she regards as morally significant or valuable, on the grounds 
that doing otherwise would have politically adverse results. Thus she might regard as politically 
bad something which she nevertheless regards as morally good. Assuming that her opposition is 
sufficiently personal, volitional, and so forth, and that she “enemizes” the relevant people or their 
well-being, there is little reason to deny that her opposition might be malevolent.  
 A third way of alleviating the relevant tension, also alluded to above, requires 
distinguishing between two different ways of “regarding” something as good or bad. It is not 
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difficult to imagine a malevolent person who, say, in an immediate or personal way, regards as 
bad that which, in a rather distant, abstract, or impersonal manner, she also acknowledges or 
regards as good.13 This person might experience the object of her malevolence as bad, while still 
acknowledging, at some level or in some way, that this object is good or has positive worth or 
value. While actually making or holding to the relevant judgments in this case might involve a 
certain amount of self-deception or irrationality, it represents a genuine psychological possibility, 
and one that falls within the boundaries of intuitive ways of thinking about malevolence. It does 
not make malevolence look implausibly irrational or cognitively dissonant. 
Fourth, and finally, a malevolent person might regard the object of her malevolence as 
both bad and good by regarding it as bad in one respect or under one description and as good in 
a different respect or under a different description. Suppose I acknowledge that the professional 
success of Jones would add to his happiness and in this respect regard it as a good thing. But 
suppose I am also filled with contempt for Jones and everything he stands for, such that, relative 
to my own happiness, I regard Jones’s success as bad. This characterization does not employ 
different standards of “good” and “bad”: happiness is the sole normative criterion. Further, the 
co-instantiation of the relevant judgments, while perhaps not fully rational, is not irrational or 
incoherent in a way that conflicts with our ordinary ways of thinking about malevolence. Again, 
while I regard Jones’s success as both “good” and “bad” in a single sense, I regard it as good 
under one description (as a contributor to his happiness) and bad under a different description (as 
a potential threat to my own happiness). Once again it is plausible to think that my orientation 
toward Jones might be malevolent.  
We have examined four different ways in which a malevolent person might, in some 
sense, at some level, or in some respect, regard the object of his malevolence as both good and 
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bad without manifesting a problematic kind or level of irrationality. It is important to note that 
the ways in question are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, it is plausible to think that 
malevolence can, and often does, involve some combination of these ways. For instance, an 
individual might, in an immediate and experiential way, regard the object of his malevolence as 
“worthy of opposition,” while, at another, more distant and perhaps semi-conscious level, 
regarding it as “good.” This scenario combines the “semantic gap” and “different ways of 
regarding” possibilities identified above. Alternatively, a malevolent person might regard the 
object of his malevolence, at one level and in one respect, as bad, while, at another level and in a 
different respect, regarding it as good, thereby illustrating the “different ways of regarding” and 
“different respects” possibilities. We may conclude that the dual judgments central to 
malevolence do not ultimately generate a problematic psychological conflict within the 
psychology of malevolence as we are conceiving of it.  
2. An Epistemic Counterpart of Malevolence 
We are now in a position to turn our attention to the idea of epistemic malevolence, and 
specifically, to the question of whether there is such a thing as epistemic malevolence, and if so, 
just what it amounts to. In fact, the groundwork for an answer to these questions has already 
been laid. In the previous section, we saw that malevolence proper is reasonably understood in 
terms of “opposition to the good as such,” and that it admits of both impersonal and personal 
varieties. It is plausible, I submit, to think of epistemic malevolence as opposition to the 
epistemic good as such, and to maintain that it too admits of both impersonal and personal 
varieties. Let us, for the moment, identify the epistemic good with knowledge. Accordingly, we 
can think of “impersonal” epistemic malevolence as (roughly) opposition to knowledge as such; 
and “personal” epistemic malevolence as opposition to another person’s share in knowledge, or 
 
 14 
to her epistemic well-being, as such. I turn now to consider five candidate cases of epistemic 
malevolence, all of which involve some kind of opposition to knowledge. Doing so will add 
some flesh and bring some clarity to the conception of epistemic malevolence just noted. While 
several of the cases are rather extreme or hypothetical, it is not difficult to identify elements of 
these cases in ordinary experience.  
(1) Consider, first, the philosophical skeptic. This person is, in some sense at least, 
“opposed to knowledge as such,” for she denies the very possibility of knowledge, or at least of 
some significant variety of it (moral, philosophical, religious, scientific, etc.). However, given 
the model just sketched, she does not really qualify as epistemically malevolent. Among other 
things, the skeptic is not opposed to knowledge in a robustly volitional or active way; rather, her 
opposition consists merely in a denial of the possibility of knowledge. Similarly, she does not 
regard knowledge as an enemy. She might even wish that knowledge were possible and that 
skepticism were false: she might value knowledge as something that would be well worth 
pursuing if only it could be achieved. Finally, a commitment to skepticism seems actually to rule 
out the possibility of epistemic malevolence. For presumably, malevolence of any sort requires, 
at a minimum, belief in the possibility of its object. But this is precisely what the skeptic lacks.  
(2) Next consider the roughly Foucault-inspired “suspicionist.” This person regards 
knowledge as a dangerous idea or concept. She thinks knowledge has an inherently corrupting 
effect on human beings. On her view, persons who pursue and acquire knowledge do so as a way 
of trying to control and dominate others. Thus she sees all (or nearly all) knowledge claims as 
power plays. Suppose, further, that the suspicionist is adamantly for social justice. The result is 
that she is personally, vehemently, and actively opposed to knowledge: she regularly speaks out 
against this alleged “good,” discourages its pursuit among her friends and colleagues, and so on.  
 
 15 
Is the suspicionist an example of epistemic malevolence? This depends on the precise 
character of her opposition. We stipulated that she is for social justice and that this goes some 
way toward explaining her opposition to knowledge. This underscores the possibility that she is 
not really opposed to knowledge as such: that she may just be strongly in favor of social justice, 
while not really regarding knowledge as an enemy. But of course it is also possible that she does 
regard knowledge as enemy: that her opposition to knowledge is sufficiently or relevantly 
entrenched in her psychology such that she is not merely for social justice and only 
“incidentally” against knowledge. To the extent that the latter description is right, the 
suspicionist does provide a good illustration of epistemic malevolence (and of impersonal 
epistemic malevolence in particular).  
It might be objected that the suspicionist is not really epistemically malevolent on the 
grounds that there is, after all, something to her belief that knowledge corrupts and fosters social 
injustice in the relevant way.14 It might be thought that her opposition to knowledge is rational or 
justified in a way that malevolence is not. I will not stop here to assess the credentials of the 
suspicionist’s belief; however, in keeping with the discussion in section 1.5.1 above, I do think 
that if her belief about the disvalue of knowledge were in fact rational or well-supported, then 
she could not really be considered malevolent. For in that case, she would be opposed something 
she has genuine reason to think is bad, which again would seem to make her orientation 
something less than malevolent. Accordingly, we can draw the additional conclusion that a 
malevolent agent necessarily lacks good reasons for thinking that the object of her malevolence 
is bad. While questions can be raised about how exactly to understand the notions of “rational” 
or “good reasons,” I take it that the referent of these terms is sufficiently familiar and intuitive.15 
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The case of the suspicionist also generates an important question concerning the scope of 
epistemic malevolence. It is tempting to think of the suspicionist as one who is opposed to 
knowledge in general or to all knowledge. But this cannot be right. First, the suspicionist may 
very well take herself to know that knowledge is dangerous in the relevant sense, but without 
regarding this knowledge as dangerous. Second, her campaign against knowledge is itself likely 
to involve knowledge—knowledge which, again, she is unlikely to consider objectionable. 
Convincing her friends and acquaintances of the disvalue of knowledge is likely to involve, at a 
minimum, a considerable amount of practical or circumstantial knowledge (e.g. knowledge about 
their concern for knowledge, their likely reaction to her diatribes against knowledge, better and 
worse ways of convincing them of the disvalue of knowledge, and so on). Thus, as with the 
impersonal variety of malevolence proper discussed in section 1.4 above, the scope of 
impersonal epistemic malevolence is not maximally broad.16  
 (3) A third candidate case of epistemic malevolence is found in the character of O’Brien 
in George Orwell’s 1984. O’Brien is a master of mind control. He aims to acquire absolute 
control over the thinking and reasoning capacities of Winston Smith and his other subjects. He 
attempts to condition in them various submissive, shallow, and contradictory ways of thinking 
and to prohibit any kind of intellectual autonomy or reflective questioning. He explains that his 
subjects must undergo “an elaborate mental training … [which] makes [them] unwilling and 
unable to think too deeply on any subject whatsoever.” His goal is that they develop “the power 
of not grasping analogies, of failing to perceive logical errors, of misunderstanding the simplest 
arguments,” as well as “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind 
simultaneously, and accepting both of them” (1992, 174, 177).17 
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While ultimately a good illustration of epistemic malevolence, this case does not fit 
perfectly with the model sketched above. For it appears that the object of O’Brien’s opposition is 
not principally or primarily his subjects’ acquisition of knowledge, but rather their capacity to 
think and reason in a free and rational way. We might, then, draw the conclusion that O’Brien is 
not really epistemically malevolent (since again, we are thinking of epistemic malevolence as 
opposition to the epistemic good as such and have identified the epistemic good as knowledge). 
A more plausible response, however, would be to expand our conception of the epistemic good 
or epistemic well-being such that it includes an ability to think and reason in a free and rational 
way. For, a person with a great deal of knowledge, but without the ability to think and reason in 
the ways forbidden by O’Brien, surely is not very epistemically well off. If we broaden our 
conception of the epistemic good in this way, and if we assume that O’Brien regards his 
subjects’ intellectual autonomy as an “enemy,” then we may conclude that O’Brien is indeed 
epistemically malevolent (in the personal sense). 
 (4) A similar, though more realistic (and hence more tragic), example of personal 
epistemic malevolence is found in Frederick Douglass’s famous autobiography, in which he 
recounts some of his early attempts at self-education. Douglass’s mistress, Sophia Auld, initially 
strikes him as “a woman of kindest heart and finest feelings” who had “been in a good degree 
preserved from the blighting and dehumanizing effects of slavery.” As Douglass explains, she 
“commenced to teach me the A, B, C. After I had learned this, she assisted me in learning to 
spell words of three or four letters.” At this point, however, Sophia’s husband Tom intervenes, 
insisting that Sophia cease all instruction,  
… telling her, among other things, that it was unlawful, as well as unsafe, to each a slave 
to read. To use his own words, further, he said, ‘If you give a nigger an inch, he will take 
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an ell. A nigger should know nothing but to obey his master—to do as he is told. 
Learning would spoil the best nigger in the world. Now,’ said he, ‘if you teach that nigger 
(speaking of myself) how to read, there would be no keeping him … He would at once 
become unmanageable, and of no value to his master. As to himself, it could do him no 
good, but a great deal of harm. It would make him discontented and unhappy.’  
Before long, the corrupting influence of slavery lays hold of Sophia as well, divesting her of all 
of her “heavenly qualities”:  
Under its influence, the tender hear became stone, and the lamblike disposition gave way 
to one of tiger-like fierceness. The first step in her downward course was in her ceasing 
to instruct me. She now commenced to practice her husband’s precepts … Nothing 
seemed to make her more angry than to see me with a newspaper. She seemed to think 
that here lay the danger. I have had her rush at me with a face made up all of fury, and 
snatch from me a newspaper, in a manner that fully revealed her apprehension. (1999, 42-
43) 
Mr. and Mrs. Auld seem clearly to “enemize” Douglass’s epistemic well-being. They staunchly 
oppose and take active measures to thwart his acquisition of knowledge and attempts to think 
critically and autonomously.  
 This case also illustrates the claim made above that a malevolent person’s belief 
concerning the disvalue of the object of his malevolence is necessarily irrational. Mr. Auld 
suggests that part of his opposition to Douglass’s education is that it would only add to 
Douglass’s discontent and that therefore it is in his best interest prevent it. But surely Auld’s 
belief here is not well-supported or rational; and presumably this is part of what makes his 
attitude toward Douglass malevolent.18  
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 (5) A final illustration is the notorious Cartesian demon—a systematic deceiver. The 
demon, let us suppose, delights in filling his subjects’ minds with lies, in creating an ever 
deepening and insurmountable chasm between appearance and reality. Unlike O’Brien and Mr. 
Auld, he is not principally concerned with controlling or manipulating his subjects’ thought 
processes. Rather, his goal is that his subjects end up with as many false beliefs and as few true 
beliefs as possible, even if this involves their thinking or reasoning in a reasonably autonomous 
and rational way.19 On the surface, this seems to be a rather pure and straightforward case of 
personal epistemic malevolence (and, of course, Cartesian demons are sometimes referred to as 
“malevolent”).  
 My only reservation concerns the possible motivation for the demon’s deception. Our 
characterization—as with many other characterizations of Cartesian demons—at least leaves 
open the possibility that the demon’s motivation is mere amusement: that he simply gets a kick 
out of systematically misleading his subjects. But if this is right, then while the deceiver may be 
epistemically twisted or perverse, it is not clear that he is malevolent, for his opposition to his 
subjects’ epistemic well-being may not be sufficiently personal or negative. He may not regard 
their flourishing as bad or as a genuine enemy, and thus his orientation may not be adversarial 
enough to count as malevolent. That said, if we were to stipulate that the demon is personally 
opposed to their epistemic well-being, that he is bent on deceiving them, and that his opposition 
is fueled by something like spite or anger or hatred, then it would be right to view him as a 
paradigm case of personal epistemic malevolence.  
 One of the central tasks of the present paper is to identify what an epistemic counterpart 
of malevolence proper or “moral malevolence” might look like. Between the discussion of 
malevolence proper in the previous section, and the analysis of several cases in the present 
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section, the basic nature and structure of epistemic malevolence should now be fairly clear. 
Again, epistemic malevolence is plausibly understood as opposition to the epistemic good as 
such, where the good in question includes, but is not limited to, knowledge. It is also plausible to 
think of epistemic malevolence as admitting of both “personal” and “impersonal” varieties in the 
senses outlined above. 
3. Epistemic Malevolence and Intellectual Vice 
We may now turn now to address the third of our initial three questions: namely, why 
don’t we think of epistemic malevolence as epitomizing intellectual vice in the way that we think 
of malevolence proper as epitomizing moral vice? There are, in fact, two separate questions here, 
and they are best dealt with in turn. First, does epistemic malevolence epitomize intellectual 
vice? Is it a clear and informative paradigm element of it? And second, in the event that it is, 
why don’t we think of it as such? Why doesn’t it top, or at least make an appearance on, any 
standard lists of intellectual vices? The first is a question about the actual place of epistemic 
malevolence within the normative structure of intellectual vice. The second is a question about 
its place in our thinking about intellectual vice. 
 In response to the first question, I think that indeed epistemic malevolence conceived in 
the present way does epitomize intellectual vice. This is evident from certain standard ways of 
thinking about intellectual virtues and vices. First, several virtue epistemologists have thought of 
something like a desire for truth or knowledge as the underlying and unifying feature of 
intellectual virtues: that intellectual virtues, by definition, are traits that arise or flow from a love 
of knowledge.20 Second, consider what apparently underlies the traits that do tend to appear on 
standard lists of intellectual vices. These include traits like intellectual carelessness, superficial 
thinking, laziness in inquiry, dogmatism, narrow-mindedness, ignoring of evidence, and so forth. 
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Arguably, what these traits have in common, and what (at least in part) explains their status as 
intellectual vices, is either a straightforward lack of a desire for knowledge or an insufficient 
concern with knowledge relative to other concerns (e.g. a concern with power or status, or a fear 
of being mistaken). Given, then, that intellectual virtue is fundamentally a matter of loving or 
being for epistemic goods, and that many intellectual vices have in common a lack of or 
otherwise inadequate concern for such goods, it stands to reason that an outright opposition to 
these goods would epitomize intellectual vice. Indeed, such opposition, which of course is the 
very essence of epistemic malevolence, seems as much or more than any other intellectual vice 
to represent a kind of epistemic wickedness.  
 Now for the second question: why don’t we tend to think of epistemic malevolence as 
epitomizing intellectual vice? I shall assume that this is because epistemic malevolence is less 
familiar to us than malevolence proper, and that this in turn is because epistemic malevolence is 
less common, that it occurs or is manifested less frequently than malevolence proper. But why is 
epistemic malevolence less common? 
 There are, in fact, two problems with this question that need to be addressed before we 
can attempt to answer it. First, I have thus far left unclear how I am conceiving of the relation 
between malevolence proper and epistemic malevolence. At times I have suggested that the latter 
is an “application” of the former, in which case there is a sense in which epistemic malevolence 
is part of and can be subsumed under malevolence proper, while elsewhere I have described 
epistemic malevolence as a “counterpart” of malevolence proper, which at least leaves open the 
possibility that it is a separate or distinct trait. Fortunately, we need not settle this issue before 
answering the question at hand. For instead of comparing the relative incidence of epistemic 
malevolence and malevolence proper, we can compare that of epistemic malevolence and what I 
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shall now refer to as “moral malevolence,” which is opposition to the moral good or to a 
person’s moral well-being, and where the latter consists in a person’s share in certain 
recognizably moral values like life, health, the experience of higher and lower pleasures, 
freedom of movement, freedom from physical and mental suffering, and so forth. I take it that 
moral malevolence at least approximates what we have thus far been discussing under the label 
of “malevolence proper.” But whether this is so, or whether the latter is a considerably broader 
concept, need not worry us here, for epistemic malevolence remains much less common than 
moral malevolence thus defined. And again, our question is why this should be.  
 The question also stands in need of an additional refinement. As stated, it suggests that 
both personal and impersonal epistemic malevolence are less common than their moral 
counterparts. But I am not sure that this is right. Specifically, it is questionable whether 
impersonal epistemic malevolence is really less common than impersonal moral malevolence. 
Neither, it seems, is really very common at all. The former is, perhaps, more familiar, but I 
suspect this is due more to certain memorable and compelling portrayals of characters like Satan 
and the Joker than it is to an actual higher incidence of impersonal moral malevolence. Assuming 
this is right, we would do best to limit our attention to the question of why personal epistemic 
malevolence is less common than personal moral malevolence. 
 How, then, might we go about explaining this discrepancy? Here again I think that there 
need not be, and in fact is not, just a single right answer. That is, I suspect the higher incidence of 
personal moral malevolence is attributable to a confluence of factors, four of which I shall 
attempt to identify in the remainder of the paper.21  
First, the moral good or moral well-being arguably includes a greater plurality of goods 
or values than that of its epistemic counterpart. For reasons already indicated, I would not insist 
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that the epistemic good be identified with knowledge; nevertheless, as my earlier enumeration of 
the goods associated with moral well-being suggests, there does appear to more “packed in” to 
the notion of moral well-being compared with epistemic well-being. Consequently, it seems that, 
other things being equal, the greater breadth of moral well-being, or the greater number of moral 
goods, is likely to make for a greater number of occasions for personal moral malevolence. In 
short, within the moral realm, there is considerably more to be opposed to. This provides at least 
a partial explanation of the higher incidence of personal moral malevolence.  
Second, I think the higher incidence of personal moral malevolence can be attributed in 
part to the comparative value of the goods to which this kind of malevolence is opposed. If 
person A is filled with contempt, hatred, spite, vengeance, and the like, for person B, and 
consequently wishes significantly to harm B, A is more likely, I take it, to strike at B’s share in 
certain fundamental moral goods—life, health, pleasure, freedom of movement, and the like—
than he is to strike at B’s share in knowledge. And this, it seems, is due at least in part to the 
apparent greater value of the relevant moral goods. Thus, to the extent that malevolence is 
motivated, as it typically is, by hatred, revenge, spite, and the like, we have at least some reason 
to expect personal moral malevolence to be more common than personal epistemic malevolence.  
Third, there is a sense in which individual moral well-being is more vulnerable vis-à-vis 
other agents compared with individual epistemic well-being. Alternatively, it is generally easier, 
in a world like ours, to undermine another person’s moral well-being than it is to undermine this 
person’s epistemic well-being.22 It is, for instance, generally easier to undermine the pleasure, 
health, or practical autonomy of other people than it is to block their access to truth or knowledge 
or a good education. This underscores the more (though by no means exclusively) social and 
interpersonal dimension of morality and moral well-being compared with that of epistemic well-
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being. The acquisition of knowledge, while by no means a strictly solitary enterprise, is generally 
more solitary (or capable of being so) than the acquisition of moral goods. This difference can go 
some way toward explaining the higher incidence of personal moral malevolence, for our greater 
vulnerability vis-à-vis moral goods makes it more likely, other things being equal, that others 
will be opposed to, and more likely to attempt to undermine, our share in these goods.  
A fourth and final explanation is somewhat more complicated. It is rooted partly in the 
fact that malevolence often arises in connection with competition for certain goods. If you and I 
must compete for a certain mutually cherished good, this increases the probability, other things 
being equal, that enmity or malevolence will arise between us. My suggestion is that there is 
generally greater competition for moral goods than there is for epistemic goods and thus that we 
should expect a higher incidence of personal moral malevolence than personal epistemic 
malevolence.  
In what sense or why is there greater competition for moral goods? I think the 
explanation here is manifold. First, as indicated above, we generally value moral goods more 
than we do epistemic goods, in which case we are more likely to compete and to compete more 
fiercely for these goods. Second, our world and the goods in question are such that it is generally 
easier to come by the relevant epistemic goods than it is the relevant moral goods. Knowledge, 
for instance, is easily transmitted via testimony; books can be purchased at reasonable prices; the 
internet and related media place a wealth of knowledge about a vast range of subjects at our 
fingertips. Knowledge is also relatively easy to come by in the sense that one person’s acquiring 
knowledge about some subject matter X generally does not make it any less likely that someone 
else will be able to acquire knowledge about X. Knowledge is, in this respect, a “sharable 
resource.”23 The relevant moral goods, however, are often more expensive and less easily 
 
 25 
accessible. Maintaining good health, for instance, requires resources that are finite and often in 
short supply: this includes anything from affordable nourishment to state of the art of medical 
treatments. Here, one person’s laying hold of the relevant resources and resulting goods is more 
likely to pose a threat to another person’s laying hold of the same goods. The result is that, other 
things being equal, there is likely to be more competition associated with the relevant moral 
goods than with the relevant epistemic goods. Third, epistemic well-being is generally easier to 
sustain compared with moral well being. Life, health, the experience of various pleasures, etc., 
require ongoing attention and investment. The good of knowledge, however, is relatively easy to 
sustain. This is due in no small part to the faculty of memory. If I satisfy a particular epistemic 
appetite—a desire to know about X—this appetite will remain satisfied as long as I retain and 
can recall the relevant information. If I satisfy a particular bodily appetite, however—a desire for 
food, for instance—this satisfaction will quickly dissipate. There is no counterpart to memory 
within the moral domain. Because moral well-being is more difficult to sustain than epistemic 
well-being, there is likely to be more competition, and thus more malevolence, associated with 
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1 As this suggests, I am thinking of intellectual virtues as character traits, rather than as cognitive 
faculties or powers like memory, vision, introspection, reason, or the like. This difference corresponds to 
the difference between “responsibilist” or character-based and “reliabilist” or faculty-based approaches to 
virtue epistemology. For a discussion of this distinction, see Baehr 2006. For an up-to-date account of 
character-based virtue epistemology, see Baehr 2008.  
2 Throughout the discussion, my concern will be features of malevolence proper and epistemic 
malevolence that distinguish these traits from other moral and intellectual vices—not the full range of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for these traits. Thus, the satisfaction of the conditions I lay down for 
epistemic malevolence, for instance, may not be sufficient for the possession of a “full blown” intellectual 
vice; the latter may require a certain ill motivation. While I make some suggestions about what the 
motivation in question might amount to, this is not a central point or concern of my discussion. Thanks to 
Wayne Riggs for getting me to be clearer about this dimension of my paper. 
3 Some modifications to this definition will be called for; however, these can be viewed as 
“interpretations” or construals of the original definition, rather than as objections to it.  
4 Indeed, it might be wondered whether such an orientation is even possible: to be opposed to something, 
mustn’t one regard it as bad? I address this worry below.  
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5 Interestingly, Adams himself seems to want to allow for something like this possibility when he says 
that Satan might show malice toward God “simply to spite God” (40). This makes it sound as though 
Satan’s opposition to “important goods,” as Adams describes it, is indeed instrumental to a certain end 
(viz. that of frustrating or angering God). 
6 Thanks to Tom Hurka for this example. Another would be a Grinch- or Scrooge-like character who is—
by appearances—opposed to something like happiness in general, not necessarily to the happiness of any 
particular person or group of persons. Thanks to Damon Evans for this example.  
7 As this suggests, one needn’t be a Platonist about properties to accept this conception of malevolence. 
Also, it is worth noting that the end in question may be more or less “abstract” or “impersonal.” A 
malevolent person might, for instance, be against a certain kind of good activity (versus, say, the property 
of goodness or some conceptualization of it). As long as the object here is the activity understood 
generally, it still makes sense to think of this person’s malevolence as “impersonal” in the relevant sense. 
Thanks to Anne Baril for raising this point.  
8 Another potential worry about the notion of impersonal malevolence, raised to me by Miranda Fricker, 
is that benevolence—the contrary of malevolence—would not appear to admit of an impersonal variety. I 
feel the force of this worry; but again, when weighed against the reasons for thinking that there is such a 
thing as impersonal malevolence, I think the more reasonable conclusion is that malevolence and 
benevolence are not structurally isomorphic in every respect. 
9 This would be similar to the person who declares with conviction that “there is no truth” or that “only 
empirically verifiable statements have any meaning.” There is a definite sense in which such a person is 
“opposed” to truth in general or to the possibility that a non-verifiable statement might have meaning, 
notwithstanding the problematic self-referential implications of these convictions. 
10 Alternatively, we might distinguish between a “de re” opposition to a good (objective) and a “de dicto” 
(subjective) opposition. It is also worth noting that the two conceptions are not mutually exclusive in the 
sense that one can be opposed to something which in fact is good and which one also regards as such. The 
worry arises in any case in which the subjective element is present. And if the subjective element is 
essential, the problem is general.  
11 See Hurka 2001 pp. 171-80 for a related discussion. Parts of Hurka’s discussion suggest that he might 
opt for an objective conception of the object of malevolence, and specifically, that he might think of 
malevolence as involving a kind of brute, non-cognitive, or, in his terms, “simple emotional” opposition 
to its object. Such a view would be problematic, however, for at least two reasons: first, as we have seen, 
it seems essential to the very wicked or pernicious quality of malevolence that the malevolent person 
actually be aware of the (apparent) positive worth of what she opposes; and second, if the alternative to 
the relevant cognitive requirement is, as Hurka’s discussion suggests, an affective or emotional one, such 
that a malevolent person is emotionally “for” the object of her malevolence (but does not cognitively 
regard it as valuable), this makes the corresponding view look even less plausible, since it is clear that a 
malevolent person’s feelings or emotions are overwhelmingly opposed to the relevant object (even if, 
cognitively, such a person were to be aware of the object’s having a certain positive value). A related 
question or worry is whether the subjective account is inconsistent with motivational internalism. My 
response, very briefly, is that it is consistent with any plausible version of motivational internalism. It is 
consistent, for instance, with the view that if S judges X to be valuable, then S will experience some 
(potentially very minimal) motivation to comply with this judgment; and it is consistent with even weaker 
versions of motivational internalism (e.g. Smith 1994) according to which the foregoing principle holds 
only for “good and strong-willed” agents (which, needless to say, a malevolent person is not). It is 
inconsistent with the view that if S judges X to be valuable, then S will experience an overriding 
motivation to comply with this judgment. But this view is much too strong.  
12 One additional kind of case requires a further, fairly minor amendment to the subjective conception. 
These cases in question are cases of what  might be called “hardened malevolence.” Suppose, for 
instance, that I have spent so many years hating and opposing Jones that I no longer have any sense or 
awareness of his worth or well-being. It does seem possible that my orientation toward Jones might still 
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count as malevolent. Note that in such cases, it is malevolence itself that vitiates the malevolent person’s 
awareness of the value of the relevant object (in this respect it differs from th cases considered above). 
Accordingly, we might say that malevolence is a matter of being opposed to that which one regards as 
good, except where the subject’s malevolence itself has vitiated any awareness of the value of the end or 
object in question. Alternatively, we might say that malevolence is a matter of being opposed to that 
which one regards or has regarded as valuable, where the latter qualification accommodates cases of 
hardened malevolence. Either formulation provides a suitably modified, but still fundamentally 
subjective, account of the object of malevolence.  
13 This is, of course, suggestive of Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in Book VII of Nicomachean Ethics. 
The malevolent person here described lacks the kind of deep knowledge or awareness of the value of the 
object of his malevolence that the akratic person lacks of the good.  
14 Thanks to Aimee Koeplin for raising this worry.  
15 The case also underscores the fact, alluded to in note 2 above, that epistemic malevolence is consistent 
with good motives (in this case social justice), and thus that it is not always a vice (or at least not always a 
moral vice). I will not stop here to defend this position. Rather, I will simply note in passing that the same 
basic point applies in connection with several other cases and virtues: e.g. one is hard-pressed to deny that 
the terrorist (or daredevil) is courageous, even if this person’s courage does not qualify as a genuine 
virtue.   
16 The considerations just noted should not lead us to doubt the very possibility of impersonal epistemic 
malevolence. First, while a completely general opposition to truth or knowledge may be problematic, such 
opposition to other epistemic ends or values (e.g. theoretical understanding) may not be. Second, the 
same combination of logical inconsistency and self-deception discussed in section 1.4 above may be 
operative in cases of impersonal epistemic malevolence. Thanks to Linda Zagzebski for forcing me to be 
clear about this.  
17 Thanks to Daniel Ambord for this example and for conversation related to this and other aspects of 
epistemic malevolence.  
18 Auld’s irrationality lies not in his belief that learning will make Douglass discontent, but rather in his 
belief that he ought therefore to oppose Douglass’s education. If Auld’s belief is not irrational, then I take 
it that this is because his is a case of “hardened malevolence,” described and dealt with in note 12 above. 
19 Thus he might focus his efforts on imparting false “basic beliefs,” from which his subjects might reason 
impeccably, but to little epistemic avail.  
20 See e.g. Zagzebski 1996 and Montmarquet 1993.  
21 Clearly the answer to our question is largely an empirical one. However, as I hope momentarily to 
demonstrate, I think several helpful things can be said in response to it from the philosophical armchair.  
22 Thanks to Wayne Riggs for suggesting this point.  
23 There are, of course, exceptions to this and each of the considerations or suggestions I am putting forth 
in this section. My aim in this section is merely to identify the way things tend to be or how they tend to 
go relative to the goods in question (and indeed only how they tend to be or go ceteris paribus). This is all 
that is required for answering the central question of this section.  
24 I am grateful to many participants in the 2008 Fullerton International Philosophy Conference for 
helpful comments and feedback on this paper (see specific acknowledgments spread throughout the notes 
above). I owe a special thanks to Michael Pace for many hours of helpful conversation about epistemic 
malevolence and related issues.  
